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1 Introduction
Multilevel, networked systems of governance are
a fundamental fact of life in most African
conflict settings. This necessitates an analytical
focus on relationship dynamics across levels of
governance, both formal and informal, and their
role in conflict governance. Using this basic
conceptual lens, this article looks at the
coordination networks that influence the
management of aid-in-conflict in the case of
Somalia.
Not only is Somalia seen as the poster child of a
‘failed state’, the related aid efforts are
frequently described as either misguided or
unsuccessful. Be it the 15+ unsuccessful and
internationally brokered and supported peace
conferences and ‘deals’ (Menkhaus 2010, 2007),
the large sums spent on aid in its various forms
without any large impact (Norris and Bruton
2011), or the accusation of a self-interested ‘aid-
industry’ managing support to Somalia through
Nairobi-based ‘remote control’ (or ‘remote
management’), the Somalia donor community is
not getting much positive press. To many, a large
problem is that of coordination, which, if only
improved, would increase both effectiveness and
accountability of aid (OECD 2011: 14). 
This article analyses the process of country-level
aid coordination, situated between the broad
allocation decisions at donor–capital level and
the domestic preference formation at the
recipient state government. At this intermediate
level donor policies, be they project
identification, programme allocations or
monitoring mechanisms, are shaped by a
recursive engagement with other donors,
implementing partners and actors of the
‘counterpart’ or ‘recipient country’. 
Whether weak or strong, executed through
informal channels, formal groupings or reliant
on multilateral organisations, aid coordination is
part of the governance of public policy affecting
the accountability and effectiveness of aid as well
as power relationships of the actors involved.
Coordination at the country-level plays a role
everywhere, but is of particular interest in fragile
state contexts – and particularly so in the Somali
case. This is due to the specific policy dilemmas
of fragile states (and some specific to conflict
situations) and the associated operating
procedures on the donor side. More starkly than
in more ‘settled’ aid contexts, various,
simultaneous but often competing goals –
security, economic development, ‘state-building’
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and ‘peace-building’ – as well as various strategic
or political interests combine with difficult
implementation contexts: a greater ability to act
outside government counterparts’ frameworks
but also frequently less presence on the ground
and greater operational risks overall. The results
are conditions of extreme policy fluidity, where
action at the intermediate, ‘brokerage’ level can
shape both context and content of aid flows
disproportionately. Here ‘in-country’ donor
representatives take decisions on allocation,
select and scope new projects or programmes,
and have the ability to filter relevant information
upwards, including about performance and other
actors’ behaviour. In such a context, beyond the
lens of international aid systems or foreign policy
analysis, donor engagement is more fully
understood when analysed with regard to the
dense web of relationship that is created,
through continuous interaction, between UN
actors, donor representatives and various Somali
actors. All of these are connected – sometimes
loosely, sometimes tightly – via a set of material
ties (aid flows); formal contractual relationships;
through information exchange; or, at the
individual level, through personal affinities or
animosities.
In this article, I first situate the approach used by
reference to the general literature on the
determinants of aid, the role of multilateral
institutions and network relations. I then present
the case of Somalia and its aid context, marked
by multidimensional involvement, ‘remote
control’ from Nairobi and a general unease about
impact and accountability on all sides. The third
section outlines how the specific problems of
‘fragility’ here impact on the usual metropolitan-
centric mechanisms for setting donor’s
development policies. ‘Comprehensive’ strategies
that straddle various logics of engagement need
to be given concrete shape in situ, i.e. by relatively
autonomous donor country offices. The fourth
section explores the experience in Somalia with
the various ‘in-use’ networks of relationships and
coordination mechanisms which shape actual
decision-making and problem-framing on the
ground – host-country leadership, multilateral
organisations, formal committees and informal
networks. The conclusion suggests answers to a
number of related questions: What expectations
do donors have for Somalia aid coordination, and,
given these expectations, what factors enhance
the ability of some donors to pursue their
strategies successfully, i.e. what type of relational
properties matter under what type of
circumstances? Does coordination help define
what actors want and whether they can get it?
What can be learned about multilateral
approaches to coordination? 
Methodologically this article is based on
practical experience as a governance and
security adviser for the European Union Somalia
Operations Unit, as well as a basic semi-
structured network survey with 12 members of
the Somalia Donor Group (SDG) conducted in
July 2012.1 A number of caveats apply: the
analysis concentrates on the behaviour of
traditional donors and the UN system, who are
the participants in formal coordination bodies in
Nairobi. I touch on, but do not discuss in detail,
specific dynamics linked to military (non-
Development Assistance Committee) assistance
or the humanitarian sector proper, distinct from
development aid by purpose (the alleviation of
immediate suffering rather than long-term
change in socioeconomic circumstances), guided
by the humanitarian principles of impartiality
and needs-based assistance and defined by
separate funding arrangements and mechanisms
(see Macrae and ODI 2002; Hammond and
Vaughan-Lee 2012).2 Most of the practical
examples are from the ‘governance’ support
sector. Moreover, while donor coordination and
donor–recipient coordination in principle
overlap, this article focuses on the former. This is
partially a function of the specific Somalia
context of ‘remote management’ and the
absence of unitary state structures. 
2 Donor coordination and multilateralism in
conflict states
Aid analysis often concentrates on the
relationship between the variously derived
interests of donors and those of the recipient
country and how this encounter in turn drives aid
levels. Beyond this basic relationship, institutions
of coordination and joint principles
(multilateralism) may play various roles by
shaping actor interests, facilitating dialogue on
information flows and providing various degrees
of ‘rules of the game’. In the first perspective,
‘coordination’ is minimal and assumes the role of
information-sharing only. The second lens
focuses on stronger forms of coordinated or even
organised joint action or structures. This article
moves from either approach to an analysis of aid
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coordination in-country, seeing it as conditioned
by relational networks and understanding this as
a process of governance.
2.1 Determinants of aid
Most studies of the determinants of aid measure
aid broadly in quantitative terms and try to
account for the factors that drive geographical
and quantitative allocations. Alesina and Dollar
(2000) explain most cross-country differences in
aid receipts by political and strategic factors,
albeit with important national variations. 
Many overviews identify a number of factors
influencing historical trends in aid, including
need (altruism); political ideology; the dominant
development paradigm; the geopolitical position
and economic interests of both donors and
recipients, as well as bureaucratic influences or
the day-to-day procedures of those in the aid
business. While proxy measures for the first set
of factors can often be found, the latter element
is more difficult to study and thus much aid
analysis can remain quite abstract, saying little
about process-level outcomes and their influence
on the quality of aid (Hjertholm and White 2000;
Tarp 2000).
One visible part of such decision-making
processes is arguably the ever more complex
international aid architecture. Possibly due to
the multiplicity of actors and their often
complicated and often conflicting interests,
coordination and the establishment of norms and
rules to guide engagement have been a clear
trend in aid relationships. Today a host of
multilateral arrangements are used to facilitate
aid management, including the system of
international organisations coordinating or
channelling aid flows such as the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the international
development banks, and also the system of aid
summits and pledging conferences or informal
‘friends of ’ groups.
2.2 Coordination regimes and multilateralism
For some donors multilateral agencies may
simply be an implementing partner, yet the
principle of multilateralism itself carries heavier
baggage. Ruggie famously defines it as an
‘institutional form that co-ordinates relations
among three or more states on the basis of
generalised principles of conduct’, i.e. without
regard to the particularistic or strategic interests
of the parties in any specific settings (1993: 11).
As such, ‘multilateralism’ includes a belief that
certain activities ought to be organised on a
universal basis at least for a relevant group. This
differentiates it from power politics and strategic
alliances. In network language, institutional and
normative ties are created or strengthened to
soften the role of pure egocentric interest. 
Multilateralism is often seen as ‘stronger’ when
embodied in formal institutions and independent
organisations which have the specific purpose of
upholding the principles of a multilateral
agreement or norm. As such the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee
(OECD/DAC) tables distinguish between
bilateral and multilateral aid by reference to the
institutional form through which money is
channelled.
The theoretical literature tends either to hold
that for ‘what really matters’ interest cannot be
diffused, or to emphasise a variety of positive
effects of institutionalised multilateralism. The
latter points out the upholding of professional
legal or moral norms, the idea that institutions
can constrain behaviour, influence preferences,
reduce the cost and time of negotiation, provide
information, and stabilise expectations about the
behaviour of others and in short serve as a guide
to ‘right’ action, diffusing interest of foreign
policy and promoting learning and debate in the
common interest. Here a famous statement was
the UN-commissioned Pearson report in 1969
which summarised: 
The aid dialogue involves sensitive questions
of performance monitoring and advice and
persuasion in matters of policy and planning.
By playing a leading role as intermediaries in
this ongoing debate between the suppliers and
users of aid, international organisations do
much to endow development assistance with
the character of a truly international effort,
reducing any overtones of charity or
interventionism which have at times
embittered the aid process in the past (World
Bank 1969: 213–4). 
Of course since then the role of these
intermediaries themselves has been criticised as
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much as that of the initially primary actors,
proving – among other things – that overtones of
charity and problematic relationships are not the
purview of one type of actor. 
Aid coordination can result in multilateralism but
is generally based on softer forms of organising
than incorporation within international
institutions. The OECD method is a mix in this
respect, based on building up international
networks around processes of common standard-
setting. The dynamics can overlap with those
uncovered by studies of the role of transnational
networks in various issue-areas, where
harmonisation of policy across different
governments through specialised units (security
regulators, central bankers, professional
networks, etc.) create direct links between sub-
state officials without close supervision (Grant
and Keohane 2005; Slaughter 2004). 
In practice, and especially in a fragile state
context, multiple actors with multiple priorities
encounter each other with conflicting objectives
and little clear formal frameworks to go by, be it in
terms of guidelines for actions or ultimate
decision-making authority. They operate (1) with
vague policy prescriptions, (2) relative autonomy
and (3), in the Somali case in particular, without a
mutually recognised coordinator. In any fragile
state context, the model of traditional recipient
country coordination or straightforward bilateral
negotiation is undermined by the relative
weakness of the recipient country government
structures. In Somalia, the single government
counterpart is replaced by a number of regional
authorities and a nominally but not effectively
sovereign central government that executes little
of the functions associated with governing. Donors
engage with their de facto interlocutors in
differentiated ways. At the same time, for reasons
outlined below, the relative lack of strong
government leadership is not filled by multilateral
organisations, which frequently play only a limited
role in coordination. In this context a network
perspective can help look at how decisions are
made (or not) and what influences various actors
in their decision-making. The term ‘networks’ is
here understood in part as relating to networks-as-
actors, i.e. networks as an organisational form, but
is primarily used as a conceptual tool that
emphasises relationships or networks as proximate
structures, i.e. patterns of relations that condition
action (see Schmidt 2006; Elkins 2009: 44).
3 Somalia, the poster child of the fragile state
problem 
Much debate surrounds the concept of state
‘fragility’, yet in the case of Somalia, the debate
around the precise meaning, function and utility
of the associated measures can seem secondary.
Whatever measure is used, the country seems to
come out on top. Somalia leads all but one of the
major fragile state indices available, as well as
adjacent ones, such as Transparency International’s
corruption index.3 This may seem somewhat unfair
given the vibrancy of (parts of) its private sector
and the relative political stability achieved in the
north, notably by Somaliland (Harper 2012). Yet
as a whole, the country remains the most long-
standing example of state collapse, containing no
functioning national government but instead
various political entities with competing claims
for territory and authority.4 The two regional
authorities of Somaliland and Puntland have,
however, been able to restore different degrees of
stability. Somaliland’s 2010 presidential elections
ushered in a peaceful transfer of power, unique in
the region. Yet both remain weak in governance
and service delivery. Added to this, potentially
emerging regional administrations are, particularly
in the central regions, a range of informal clan-
based, religious or ‘warlord’ fiefdoms and various
regional ‘state-building’ projects. In the south,
instability is chronic and conflict recurrent and
multidimensional, impacted by material, ideological
and regional or geopolitical factors to name but a
few. Since 2006, following the US-supported
Ethiopian invasion into Somalia, a polarisation
occurred and today fighting for territory and control
continues amongst forces of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), al-Shabaab, Ethiopian
and Kenyan troops, as well as those of AMISOM
(the African Union peacekeeping force, consisting
of mostly Ugandan and Burundian troops) and a
variety of variously allied militia forces.5 A powerful
war economy sustains this conflict (United Nations
Security Council 2011), and spillover to the more
stable north remains a worry. Today some 2.5 million
Somalis remain in need of emergency humanitarian
assistance and the overall situation is increasingly
seen as creating a regional, and in certain aspects
(terrorism/piracy), a global security threat.
3.1 Who are the donors, what do they spend, and what
on? 
Donors to Somalia are many; the main
‘traditional’, DAC donors are the USA, European
Union (EU), the UK (Department for
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International Development, DFID), Japan,
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands,
as well as Switzerland, France and Italy. Of the
ten meetings that took place over the last year
(May 2011–July 2012), the SDG has 15 donors
who attended more than once, and 12 who
attended more than half. Their development
budgets range from just over US$1 million to
US$50 million annually. Outreach to the so-called
‘non-traditional donors’, including China, Turkey
and the Gulf states, who arguably are playing an
increasing role in Somalia, is a professed aim.
Including humanitarian aid, in 2009, official
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to
Somalia was US$661.65 million or $72/capita.
This is a conservative estimate because it does
not include military aid or other funds outside
the DAC criteria, but it nonetheless remains
high compared to some other fragile state
situations, including Burundi ($66), Chad ($50)
or the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($36) –
although not Afghanistan (OECD 2011).
Moreover, according to the World Bank and most
other sources, actual figures are significantly
larger, in the range of US$1 billion/annually
(OECD 2011: 19). Non-Western, or the so-called
‘non-traditional’ donors, provide significant but
difficult-to-trace support to Somalia. Overall aid
flows generally have risen and, notwithstanding
the global and European financial crisis, are set
to increase even further. All but one of the
bilateral (Western) donors interviewed for this
project indicated that their Somalia aid budgets
would increase in future years.6
The range of aid budgets among SDG donors is
wide. The two biggest are arguably the USA and
the EU institutions (the former only if
humanitarian aid and various types of military
expenditure are added). Indeed, most donors’
spending on Somalia is multidimensional. Since
the 1980s, humanitarian aid continuously
represented the lion’s share. Beyond combining
humanitarian and development roles, many
donors are also active supporters of the war effort
in Somalia, be it through training of soldiers
(EU), payment of military stipends (Italy, Spain,
USA), drone strikes (USA), or proxies such as
private security companies, many of which have
close ties to the US government in particular. The
Netherlands budget, for example, includes only
about €3 million development aid but, together
with humanitarian (€7.7 million) and other
military and piracy-related funds, adds up to close
to €29 million annually. Indeed Dutch interest in
Somalia has increased exponentially because of
the impact of piracy in the Indian Ocean on the
port of Rotterdam. Driven more by concerns
about global terrorism, US development spending
via USAID is about US$40 million annually, but
as a whole the country spends ‘hundreds of
millions’ on Somalia.7 One of these costs is the
funding for AMISOM. From July 2011 to June
2012 the UN Security Council and General
Assembly spending on AMISOM amounted to
around US$304 million, the two biggest donors
being the USA and the EU.8
Beyond such broad figures, it is difficult to say
what is being spent where at a given point in
time. DID-funded research on institutional
support provided to the Transitional Federal
Institutions (TFIs) struggled to aggregate figures
per year due to the different budget and funding
cycles of various donors and the multiplicity of
actors involved. With methodological caveats, it
noted that in 2010 the total publicly disclosed
‘current and ongoing’ support to the TFIs in the
areas of Rule of Law and Security, Central
Institutions, Planning and Finance, Political
Outreach, and Local Administration and
Recovery was around US$85 million or more. 
When it comes to engagement, larger donors
(USA, EU, UK DFID, but not Japan) are also
more spread in their engagement, indicating ten
or more issue-areas in which they are engaged, as
opposed to smaller donors, who indicated between
three and eight. All indicated Peace-building
(understood in various ways, at local or at national
level) and Humanitarian Relief. The next highest
ranking were Health, Security and Rule of Law
(80 per cent of donors); least mentioned were
Infrastructure, Economic Development and
Human Rights. When asked to prioritise, all but
one indicated ‘governance’ as central.
3.2 Nairobi and ‘remote management’
If there is a conceptual case to speak about aid
coordination networks as ‘intermediary’
locations, this is particularly apt in the Somalia
context, where almost all of the donor
community as well as most implementing
partners – and a good part of their elite Somali
counterparts – are based in Nairobi (Kenya),
practising what is euphemistically called ‘remote
management’. There are both good and bad
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reasons for this. Somalia remains possibly the
globe’s most dangerous place for aid workers. In
2008, two thirds of all aid workers killed
worldwide were in Somalia (Bradbury 2010: 2). 
The persistence of this ‘aid community in exile’
has become notorious. For many Somalia-based
Somalis, the ‘Nairobi-culture style’ is a pejorative
term to underline the lack of engagement with
the ‘true’ Somali context and to describe a
network effect in which ideas and priorities are
set within the context of specific personal
relations rather than Somali ‘ground truth’.
‘Remote control’ is said to reduce tacit and local
knowledge.9 From the Somali side, donors are not
perceived as accountable, while from the donor
side the persistence of the Somalia war economy
and the lack of transparent financial systems on
the part of the TFIs have led to a blame-game on
accountability, certainly with regards to South
Central Somalia (OECD 2011: 25). The
‘transition’ context does little to attenuate
matters. To Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, the
ongoing coexistence of different aid logics and
the lack of clear articulation between them have
created an all-pervasive ‘climate of distrust’
(2012: 2). In turn the clamour for ‘coordination’ is
everywhere. In the survey on the implementation
of the OECD fragile state principles, ‘most actors
suggested the need for improved co-ordination to
enhance analysis, improve transparency and
accountability and move towards in-country joint
co-ordination efforts’ (OECD 2011: 51). 
4 Defining policy in situ: ambiguity and autonomy
4.1 Vague policy prescriptions
In conflict and transition settings, actors need to
straddle different logics. At the broadest level,
most policy prescriptions for external engagement
in so-called fragile states insist particularly on two
basic ingredients: (1) ‘comprehensive approaches’
containing multiple objectives, and (2)
coordination. The rationale is straightforward: the
various dimensions of fragility, notably political,
developmental and security, are interdependent
and actors need to avoid undercutting each other
or themselves when acting across them. As the
OECD fragile states report on Somalia puts it: 
The challenges… are multi-dimensional. The
political, security, economic and social spheres
are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may
be tensions and trade-offs between
objectives… which must be addressed when
reaching consensus on strategy and priorities
(OECD 2011: 62). 
Or, in the words of the authors of the World Bank
report: ‘military-only, justice-only or development-
only solutions will falter’ (2011). The resulting
work of identifying and negotiating trade-offs and
priorities is intensely contextual and contingent
on events. It is also political. The risk is that one
part of the ‘comprehensive’ package will eclipse
the others, with negative results over time.
Moreover, in a crisis context, this work must often
be done under time pressure, without recourse to
a long chain of deliberation. 
In Somalia, neither guidelines nor broad
narratives provide much guidance. Asked for their
guidelines, few donors referenced more than
broad agreements at the international level such
as the OECD fragile state principles, the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or their
own country’s (global) development policies. Some
– Norway, Sweden and Switzerland – indicated
work on a future Somalia strategy. Meanwhile, as
one donor said: ‘We are very invested in the
OECD process. But no Somalia strategy. We have
donor principles – Paris Declaration, etc. but
nobody is really in charge’. One of the biggest
donors noted that there are ‘no specific
documents that we need to refer to. General ODA
guidelines but nothing specific to the Somalia
issue. It depends on our shoulders.’ Another (big)
donor referred to a 12–15-page document by its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as being ‘very general,
no reasoning for why we should do this or that’.
4.1.1 Conflicting policy narratives and ‘umbrella’ policies
In broad terms, aid in Somalia has concentrated
on provision of humanitarian support as well as
efforts to re-establish functioning governance
and, unsuccessfully, on traditional ‘state-
building’. Where donor agendas in Somalia are
multiple and the context difficult, the guiding
effect of grand narratives is limited.
Of course, at the macro-level ‘good things’ are
easily agreed upon: security (‘human’ and
otherwise) and stable structures of governance,
including a dignified finish to the latest ‘political
transition’. Dissent, however, can reign about
what this actually means and how to prioritise
various goals. The overarching goal of ‘state-
building’, much vaunted in the literature on
fragile contexts and still part of the basic
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approach to Somalia, has been criticised for
disregarding the Somali context and, in its
application, helping to maintain an illegitimate
political elite that lives off playing the role of
formal interlocutors to international actors.
Indeed, often a practical tension exists between
the insistence on traditional state-building vs
approaches rooted in grass roots local
governance (Menkhaus 2007; Bradbury and
Healy 2010; Leonard and Samantar 2011).
Definitions (and practical consequences) of the
goal of ‘state-building’ also differ widely among
international actors. In turn, the Somali
counterparts do not have a unified vision of a
state either (OECD 2011: 11). Indeed the EU
Governance Support Framework as written by
the Nairobi office now argues that 
In the specific Somali context, [the goal of
state-building]… is reformulated as the aim
of creating viable public authorities at various
levels, which are able to interact peacefully
with each other and their citizenry.
4.2 The role of intermediary level for aid in conflict
settings
Within the context of broad strategies, decision-
making at capital level leaves wide room for
manoeuvre for the intermediate level – in-country
aid offices. This is by both intention
(decentralised aid) and default. Ansell (2011: 5)
argues that the role of intermediate actors in
decision-making and influencing change over time
grows disproportionately where actors are ‘cross-
pressured between competing institutional
imperatives or control attempts’: or actors, events
or activities are difficult to describe in terms of
one specific institutional framework but instead
are ‘betwixt and between’ the cracks of existing
institutions or indeed are ‘trans-institutional’, i.e.
straddling institutional boundaries or involved in
institutions that may themselves ‘interpenetrate’
and overlap. Whereas in donor capitals often
political and developmental logics are heavily
institutionalised and separated by – and
coordinated through – highly bureaucratic
procedures, in-country these functions are often
more fused. This may be at the institutional level,
with programmes of institutional or ‘governance’
support, but is also personnel-driven. Among
interviewed donors only UK DFID, USAID and
the EU have more than ten full-time staff working
on Somalia, with all others between one and five.
For some, including Norway, the Netherlands,
Finland, Germany and Switzerland, development
(but not necessarily humanitarian) and political
functions are combined in one person, creating
‘straddlers’ that need to mediate and act across
political and development logics. The EU special
envoy to Somalia combines the post of the senior
representative of the new European External
Action Service with that of head financial officer
for EU Development Aid. Moreover the alignment
of possible conflicting imperatives or time frames
is often left to ad hoc tactics and negotiation: 
While 73 per cent of development partners
identified trade-offs between political,
security and development within their
respective country strategies, only 18 per cent
had processes in place to manage such trade-
offs (OECD 2011: 37). 
Importantly, the fusion of political and
development logics is also due to the fact that
the distinction between the two spheres,
jealously guarded in many donor structures, does
not exist for recipient authorities, for whom the
allocation of scarce funds remains an intensely
political act. Interpenetration of different actors
also takes place through the rotating doors that
exist for sought-after capable (or English-
speaking) national staff between donor agencies,
recipient administrations and well-paying
international implementing partners. 
4.2.1 Policy prescription in situ
In short, in situations where, on the one hand,
institutional or normative frameworks present
competing pressures for actors or create lacunae
of definition, but on the other hand mutual
dependencies are great and not solved by
decision-making hierarchies, ambiguities of
control and definition are likely to be ‘resolved’
in situ and at the level of the in-country donor
offices or delegations. As intermediate actors
they have the opportunity, and – where aid
structures are decentralised – the recognised
responsibility to negotiate the links between
broader international dynamics and local
context. In general, aid officials in country
offices have a denser web of ties to other donors
than that present at the capital level and they
channel context-relevant information upward or
act as ‘sinks’ or selective filters for it. They
themselves create structures of multilateralism
by identifying and selecting implementing
partners and disbursement modalities such as
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joint project funds. Arguably over time the
priorities and principles developed at this level
feed back into national or multilateral policies. 
The relative importance of decision-making in
Nairobi is reflected in the self-perception of
donor representatives. Most felt that they had
high autonomy over decision-making either
because they wrote their own strategy or because
they had a big influence over it by identifying
relevant projects and being responsible for their
evaluation. Some, such as Sweden and the
Netherlands, were just in the process of getting
more formal responsibilities and autonomy over
allocation. The EU was more hesitant, pointing
to lengthy internal procedures in Brussels, but
still indicated that ultimately strategies and
project identification was done at Nairobi-level.
Moreover, given that formal ‘crisis procedures’
apply to Somalia, the delegation is able to enter
into direct agreements with implementing
partners when deemed necessary without having
to go through a tender process or a call for
proposals. Moreover, the EU Special
Representative for Somalia acts as the National
Authorising Officer (NAO) on behalf of the
Somali authorities and thus the project approval
process remains in-house. 
Most donor representatives, but also the UN
actors interviewed, felt fairly comfortable with
their authority to make day-to-day decisions and
thought that external control over their work was
rather low. For the Resident Coordinator’s office,
such control was seen as higher in the
humanitarian field than for development. For
most, if external control was exercised, it was
only sporadic, and, for some but not all, politically
motivated. This brought its own problems. As one
major donor put it: ‘Sometimes it is highly
intense; sometimes not at all. Because it’s
sporadic it’s more problematic, because there is
no proper shared body of knowledge and nobody
who follows things continuously’. Another donor
felt that there was almost no external control but
at times high-level statements from the capital
could suddenly throw up new work programmes. 
5 Coordinating policy in the absence of a
mutually recognised coordinator 
Given the above conditions, Nairobi-based aid
coordination sometimes is, and to many should
more often be, a crucial means to help provide
content to a fluid policy context and could help
make crucial decisions about aid in Somalia.
There is indeed no shortage of coordination
mechanisms; the benefits of coordination,
however, seem to remain elusive. Indeed, the
‘plethora of fragmental international
coordination mechanisms and few joint (national-
international) co-ordination mechanisms’ are
seen as a problem by all those participating in the
fragile state survey (OECD 2011: 14). 
Three main, often overlapping, avenues for
coordination exist: through joint strategies,
through formal coordination bodies and systems,
and informally through ad hoc ‘club’ type
solutions. Each is discussed in turn. 
5.1 Coordinating by strategy 
The most expansive of these is probably the
Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP), itself the result of a two-year Joint Needs
Assessment (JNA 2004–07) led by the UN and
World Bank. The RDP, costed at US$2.2 billion
over five years, was to present a comprehensive
framework to move from crisis recovery to
development and ‘reconstruction’. At a cost of
US$4.2 million, the JNA involved some 136
experts, half of which were Somali, and included
consultations across Somalia (CISS ExCom n.d.).
Most donors engaged in the process as well as
the UN system nominally committed to the RDP.
It informs the EU and Norway Joint Strategy
Paper (JSP 2008–13) and the United Nations
Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS). However,
the five-volume consensus document did not
provide for prioritisation of activities and was
rampantly holistic. As one participant and major
donor put it, ‘It contained every sector, sub-sector
of engagement possible. Hence, alignment has
occurred by default… mostly because everything
was there in the document to align to.’ While
participatory in the process, it did not necessarily
improve relations among the major actors. It
‘contributed to raise expectations without limits,
leaving donors to deal with such heightened
expectations’. As acknowledged by a UN
reflection paper in 2012: 
Within the context of ongoing conflict and
continuously conflicting imperatives the RDP
failed as a practical programming tool. It was
also widely seen as being heavily influenced by
the UN agencies’ desire to reflect their natural
programming affinities (CISS ExCom 2011).
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In short, there was ultimately little real buy-in
and no consensus on how to act. The deeper
problems of ownership and the recurrent, but
over time varying trade-offs between core
objectives, remained procedurally and
substantively unaddressed. The UNSAS plan is
equally difficult to disentangle. On the one hand
it affirms the principles of humanitarian actions
as independent from any other occurrences but
on the other, it equally urges all action to be
supportive of peace-building, i.e. de facto a
political process (see Hammond and Vaughan-
Lee 2012: 9). 
If the RDP should have been owned by Somali
authorities and international actors, this was not
to be. By 2012 Somaliland had prepared its own
National Development Plan (with support by
UNDP) for which it sought donor alignment, and
Puntland’s was in preparation. For South Central
Somalia and the TFIs, the officially relevant
strategy paper became in 2011–12 the ‘Roadmap
to End the Transition’. The Roadmap was
adopted in September 2011 and co-signed by the
so-called ‘principals’ – key Somali politicians. It
lists the key tasks that the TFIs should undertake
with donor support in order to complete the
‘transition’ by August 2012.10 Operationally, the
Roadmap is supposed to be supported by a Joint
Security Committee and four technical working
groups consisting of donors, UN and Somali
counterparts. Yet even this document, benefiting
from high-level political attention, arguably failed
both in implementation and as a fundraising tool
vis-à-vis donors, largely due to what was seen as
excessive costings. Prioritisation at the end of the
transition was driven by what was (more) easily
achievable rather than by agreement on what was
most important (see below) and its committee
structure never took off.
5.2 Coordinators: government, multilaterals and formal
bodies
Making and implementing strategy among a set
of heterogeneous actors subject to a multitude of
pressures and priorities is ultimately an act of
continuous interpretation. Agreement on precise
texts is difficult and most strategies will reflect
that fact. In this context, ongoing coordination is
required both to interpret and prioritise, and to
provide forums of accountability, whether
between peers or across different types of actors.
Reflecting this need, lack of effective coordination
is a widely recognised problem of all participants
in the Somali aid community. Equally reflective of
this need is the abundance of coordination
structures in Nairobi. Respondents listed a total
of 20 different working groups and bodies they
themselves participated in, which still remains a
conservative estimate. Yet all are characterised
by (a) the relative absence of Somali
interlocutors; (b) a declining influence of the UN
agencies; (c) an uneasy distinction between
‘political’ and ‘technical’, ‘development’ and
‘humanitarian issues’; and (d) a general tendency
of donors to call for coordination, complain about
the multiplicity of related fora and arguably fail
to seriously commit to any of them.
5.2.1 Coordination through ‘counterparts’
This article concentrates on coordination
between donors. Yet under ‘best practice’ this
coordination should be steered by national
authorities taking the lead in organising the
many actors that try to help them improve their
affairs. Capacity issues on all sides, as well as a
host of other relational factors – notably
pervasive distrust – mean that such processes
barely function, even where tried. First of all, in
Somalia, the necessity to engage separately with
the different ‘entities’ means that any donor
coordination efforts, be it with each other or with
counterparts, need to be multiplied by three. For
many donors staffing issues make this difficult.
Moreover, the low administrative capacity of
Somali authorities and the low trust among
donors and counterparts means in general aid is
not aligned with (in any case, largely non-
existent) national systems. As a result, planning
processes are rarely joint and almost all donor
programmes are implemented though UN or
international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) or other parallel project implementation
units, again multiplying the number of policy-
relevant actors.
Especially with regard to the TFIs, the absence
of a credible interlocutor is keenly felt. Where
discussions with their representatives about
institutional support take place, they are often
highly abstract. Due to problems of access and
their location in Nairobi few donors have actually
seen the institutions they debate, and rumours
about their Potemkin-like nature abound (and
are frequently confirmed). For instance, in 2010
during a number of meetings of the UNDP-
facilitated ‘stipend task force’, which turned
around support packages for core ministries, the
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government bargained hard around the number
of ‘core staff ’ it wanted supported. Then one of
its own representatives interrupted noting that
the discussion seemed surreal since all these
administrative structures that were talked about
did not ‘really’ exist: ‘You have no ministry,
minister’. Similarly, after years of UN support for
the Somali Central Bank an external evaluation
of the relevant programme noted that it was ‘an
institution in name only’ fulfilling none of the
functions of a Central Bank (Thery and Amici
2012). A 2010 DFID-led attempt to place
technical assistance into the TFG Ministry of
Planning to facilitate donor coordination and aid
management brought little result, in part due to
lack of access. As an answer to such issues, the
Somali donor community seems to have taken
the position that country-led coordination is not
an option and retreated to very punctual and
symbolic interaction with its counterparts. The
network images show this starkly. They are based
on respondents ranking their interaction with
various international or Somali actors
(minimum 0: no interaction; maximum 3: close
interaction). Interaction with both UN actors
and other donors is significantly more frequent
than with government counterparts. 
Figures 1 and 2 collapse all actors of a specific
type into nodes or ‘blocks’ and show the average
strength of connection between blocks, i.e. of actors
of one type with that of another type (possible
minimum = 0, possible maximum = 3). 
Figure 1 focuses on core donors interviewed
(node #1). This block’s strongest connections are
to each other (in-block average 1.9). This is
followed by linkages to block #4 (UN agencies,
average 1.3), other donors’ political offices (#3)
and other development donors (#2). The right
side connections are comparatively weaker,
indicating the relative weaknesses of interaction
with TFG authorities (#5), Somaliland
authorities (#7) and, weakest, Puntland
authorities (#6).
Figure 2 shows the same for the UN actors
interviewed. In-block ties are strongest and
comparatively stronger than that of the donor
block (average in-ties 2.83), in part driven by a
level of organisational integration as part of the
UN family and the Integrated Strategic
Framework. Ties to core donors (#4), political
donor offices (#2) and other UN agencies (#3)
are relatively equal with ties to regional or
central authorities. The strongest connections
are to the TFIs (#4), followed by Somaliland
(#6) and Puntland (#5). 
Together these images suggest that donors are
highly unbalanced in their interaction, focused
on peers and UN agencies, whereas UN agencies
are more evenly balanced, with strongest ties to
the TFIs. This reflects their role as intermediaries
between international development donors and
recipient institutions, as well as the larger
attention paid to Mogadishu institutions to the
detriment of the more stable North. 
Beyond sectoral meetings in areas such as in
health and education, which take place every
three to four months, and some project-specific
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board meetings, no regular coordination
structures exist in which donors and government
representatives meet. A high-level aid dialogue
was launched in Somaliland but remained
embryonic at the time of writing. The UN-
managed committee-structure of the Roadmap
process failed to be implemented. On ‘good
governance’ one trilateral meeting took place
but remained a one-off. Interaction with
government actors is thus ad hoc and rare for
most donors. Ties are weak in substance and in
frequency. Asked to rank the level of their
collaboration with government actors, other
donors, and the UN system, SDG members
consistently ranked collaboration with
government actors lowest. One explained: 
When I first came here I wondered ‘Who are we
coordinating with?’ Now I don’t ask that question
anymore. We have no counterpart… In Somalia with
the High Level Aid Coordination forum – the
Somalia donor group is trying to take this seriously
but there has not yet been impact on my decision-
making… in South-Central there is nobody to talk to
seriously. 
Notably only one (major) donor believed
collaboration with government was more
valuable for its work than collaboration with the
UN system, mainly because it was adverse to
channelling money through the latter. For all
others the relationship was inverse. In the words
of one interlocutor: ‘It should not be like this, but
it is’. Another of the major donors explained its
minimum level of interaction with government
bodies in terms of its choice of partner: ‘We fund
through UN agencies and tell them to cooperate
with Somali authorities’. The next section
reviews the role of UN actors as mediators,
implementers and interlocutors. 
5.2.2 Multilateralism in organisational form –
coordinating through UN agencies 
As noted earlier, organisational multilateralism
is one way to tackle coordination problems. The
UN plays a prominent role in Somalia both
politically, through the offices of the UN Political
Office for Somalia (UNPOS), led by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General, the role
of its Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator
(HC/RC) and through the large presence of its
specialised agencies implementing both in the
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Figure 3 Average perceptions of degree and value of
collaboration with donors, the UN and Somali
















humanitarian and development field. Almost
100 per cent of the considerable Japanese aid to
Somalia is channelled through the UN, as are
80 per cent of the Netherlands’ humanitarian
funds and 50 per cent of its spending on
governance. Figures for most other donors
interviewed are roughly similar. The EU
channels 35 per cent of its overall spending
through the UN but does so disproportionately in
its institution-building and governance portfolio.
The USA and, less so, UK DFID buck this trend,
having reduced their development funding via
UN agencies over the last years. 
In 2012 the instruments used were multi-donor
programmes, a number of joint agency
programmes or pooled funds, and three currently
existing Trust Funds, of which two are managed
by UNPOS and one is the Common Humanitarian
Fund, managed by the UNRC/HC. 
The duality of UN roles, as implementers and as
brokers for coordination can cause problems. One
is the patchy record of implementation.
Consecutive reports of the UN Arms Embargo
Monitoring Group for Somalia have raised issues
of transparency and management with regards to
mostly humanitarian but also development
projects. The high reliance on UN actors for
implementation coupled with little in-country
oversight has increased both justified criticism
and unjustified scapegoating. At the same time
UNPOS is widely criticised as both highly
politicised (read: biased) and lacking capacity. In
turn many of the Somali authorities and donors
express dissatisfaction with the UN agencies as
both implementers and convenors of policy-
relevant dialogue. One key donor, while ranking
collaboration with the UN quite highly, ranked
the value of this collaboration as minimal ‘because
they just don’t deliver’. In addition, internal
divisions mean that much energy is spent on
internal coordination and alignment. As one
interlocutor put it with regards to coordination: 
There is no real structure and no lead. The
Resident Coordinators Office should do this
and be allowed to do it, but it can only happen
if there is more integration and the
humanitarians come on board.11
5.2.3 Formal coordination bodies
In this context formal coordination structures are
an ongoing project. Beyond sectoral ones, a set of
‘political’ bodies exist alongside two principal
multi-sectoral ‘developmental’ ones. The latter
were once again in the process of reform during
the time of writing. Both are offsprings of the
Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) which
was founded in 1993 and which was uniquely
based on bringing together three types of actors –
UN bodies, NGOs and donors (Von Hippel 2007).
In 2005, the SACB transformed into the
Coordination for International Support to Somalia
(CISS) bodies whose executive committee is
co-chaired by the HC/RC and the World Bank. In
2011 its support secretariat was disbanded and
some functions transferred to the Resident
Coordinators Office. A current Aid Effectiveness
Secretariat (AES) consists of one person and
supports the SDG, which brings together all
interested donors, with the HC/RC as well as
UNPOS as observers.12 It is noteworthy that,
possibly because of the absence of coordination
through government, UN and donors have
historically vied for dominance in coordination
structures for Somalia (Von Hippel 2007).
(a) Coordinating ‘development’: SDG and CISS ExCom
The SDG is a soft and voluntary coordination
structure that holds regular (monthly), well-
attended meetings. Its mailing list includes over
90 individuals, while attendance at meetings
averaged 13.5 between May 2011 and July 2012.
A relatively stable group of some eight core
donors plus UNPOS and the RCO attends more
than 80 per cent of meetings. Participants see it
as necessary but not necessarily effective. ‘You sit
together and meet colleagues but [it is] not a
useful vehicle; more of a loose happening’; ‘The
agenda repeats other meetings and there are no
conclusions’. The SDG does not engage in joint
programming discussions which, if at all, take
place outside the forum on an ad hoc basis and it
takes no joint or binding decisions (but has
written joint letters of concern), and its co-chairs
perform representative functions vis-à-vis
government authorities, notably in the emerging
dialogue with Somaliland. The fact that the SDG
is primarily about information sharing and does
not take decisions means that participants are
not required to prepare for the agenda, arguably
impacting on the quality of discussion.
The main challenges recognised include those of
internal reform and possibly sub-structures,
engagement with ‘non-traditional’ partners, and
outreach into Somalia. Another is engagement
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with the ‘political side’, i.e. the deliberations
taking place among political representatives of
donors and UNPOS. Some tension about the
participation of the UN in the SDG also exists.
As one respondent put it: ‘The SDG should be
more for donors to discuss and align and then we
can bring that into the CISS; not invite UN and
NGOs to SDG’. The CISS ExCom meetings,
whose membership overlaps with but is more
restrictive than the SDG, was seen as relevant
but again issues of mandate, decision-making
power and overall relevance were raised. In the
words of one of the more critical interlocutors:
‘It’s not going anywhere. It’s like people attend
not because they expect something but [because]
they say “Let’s go through that rather than
having to figure out what we’re really doing”’.
Overall, respondents to the OECD survey on
fragile states acknowledged that formal
coordination had no or only marginal impact on
agreement on objectives. And yet, discomfort
with existing mechanisms is not reflected in a
clamouring for more binding ties or processes –
while criticising its loose nature, most
respondents effectively described the SDG when
asked about the characteristics a formal
coordination body should possess.13
(b) Coordinating diplomats: political fora
The ‘P3+’ meetings – gathering three permanent
members of the Security Council (USA, France
and the UK) plus a number of other Western
diplomatic missions and UNPOS – is a regular
‘political-level’ coordination body with large
informal elements. Based on a club model,
participants are selected by a somewhat diffuse
process of status recognition. It has regular and
well-attended meetings but no permanent
structures, is chaired by each meeting’s host and
no minutes are taken. It does sometimes conclude
action points or agrees on messaging vis-à-vis
counterparts, including a certain division of
labour in that respect. Wielding some concerted
power, it is seen by most of its participants as the
body that most influences their decision-making
(only one, major, donor stated that coordination
bodies, including the P3+ were merely ‘a
confirmation of our polices, we use them to gain
consensus, influence others’). It is seen as a
crucial body for UNPOS, both to pass messages
and to align with major donor interests. As a body
that understands itself as purely political, the
interaction with the other more development-
oriented fora is indirect through de facto
overlapping membership. Examples are Norway
and France, which only have one person for both
functions, and the EU, whose representative is
the head of both the EU development arm and
the representative of the EU External Action
Service. It also occurs through the messaging that
more technical programme or project-specific
steering groups receive from the P3+. This
general interaction is not always without
problems, notably when political interests in
Somalia increased drastically with the run-up to
the key transition dates. Given that the P3+
rarely discusses project-related issues unless
considered directly politically relevant, adequate
information flows are not structurally given. In
the management of the highly sensitive donor-
funded constitution-making process disagreements
and friction with the implementer, a Joint Unit of
UNDP and UNPOS were at times exacerbated by
the latter’s success in participating directly in
P3+ meetings. This created a dynamic in which
the P3+ was seemingly green-lighting processes
that had been critically discussed at the technical
‘development’ level. While in part based on a
difference of priorities between political and
development actors, the resulting problems of
management were also due to the ability of one
implementing actor to play off the gaps in
information exchange and coordination between
different elements of donor engagement. 
In summary, what is notable in the Somali
coordination structure is that the ‘Roadmap to
End the Transition’ was the only strategic
framework that (a) included different types of
actors – agencies, government and donors – and
was, at least in theory, (b) anchored in regular
formal coordination processes at both technical
and political level.14 As noted above, however, the
Roadmap committee structures never really took
off and the close timelines of the transition
became the dominating theme of the Roadmap
as a whole.15 In addition, there is no general
coordination structure that incorporates
systematic discussion around one of the key
concerns of donors and government actors,
exacerbated by the reality of ‘remote control’,
namely processes of aid impact assessment,
indicators, monitoring or evaluation or shared
analysis of process variables. 
5.2.4 Ad hoc and informal ties
Not surprisingly given this broader context, ad hoc
and informal coordination mechanisms dominate
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the coordination activities of donors to Somalia.
Almost by tautology, these processes are seen as
more effective by those who participate in them.
They are self-selected and sought out when actors
are motivated for it and look for specific solutions
to concrete problems. This corresponds to
assumptions that the informal is more flexible
and allows information to flow faster whilst having
low ‘sovereignty costs’ – no public or binding
commitments are necessary. Voluntariness allows
for exit and flexibility maintained. 
Specific issue-areas in which informal
consultations have been particularly useful were
the constitution processes. The other area, not
unexpectedly, was security sector assistance. The
prevalence of informal connections in decision-
making draws attention to the centrality scores
indicated by the (limited) network mapping
conducted. Given this network is only a partial
mapping (only a small subset of actors were
interviewed) the analysis is necessarily partial.
What is interesting in this respect is that key
donors’ centrality scores (on the y-axis of
Figure 4) are, as could be expected, higher than
those of smaller donors, but not necessarily
significantly so. In part this may be a result of
the fragile state scenario where the ability to
disburse money flexibly and quickly provides
specific donors with key roles in processes that
often change quickly. Norway is one example of
this trend. The scores also show that very small
actors, such as Switzerland, may play roles that
are more prominent than the monetary size of
their portfolio suggest. 
To visualise the above, Figure 4 groups all actors
mentioned in the survey instrument by type (on
the horizontal axis) and locates them on the
vertical axis according to their in-degree
centrality. The more the interviewed actors
indicated ties to a specific actor and the stronger
these cumulated ties (1–3), the lower they are
situated on the vertical axis and the bigger is
their respective node.
One issue area of great concern has been about
alignment on various Principles of Engagement
across Somalia in line with a ‘do no harm’
principle anchored in the guidelines for
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Figure 4 Centrality scores by type 
Interviewed Other Donors – UN TFIs Puntland Somaliland ‘Others’ ‘Civil Society’
donors donors political agencies authorities authorities (write-in) – generic
Note Some actor nodes have been artificially separated from each other to reveal them more clearly in the image. Note
therefore that the dense group of donors on the bottom left all share the same in-degree centralities, as does the dense
group of UN agencies above the UNDP node.
engagement in fragile states. While initiatives
were launched first in informal discussion, they
tended to slow down drastically when a degree of
formality was introduced. Within the
humanitarian community, Joint Principles or ‘red
lines’ were proposed in 2008–09 to define how
humanitarian principles could be upheld in the
Somali context. While mentioned in a number of
documents, the principles never became official,
in part because they would be breached in the
daily (bilateral) negotiation of access and
operational space by most actors (Hammond and
Vaughan-Lee 2012: 12). 
On the development side, a related attempt at
Joint Principles for ‘engagement with emerging
areas’ is still ongoing and concerns the attempt to
bridge ‘stabilisation’ (security and political) and
development (long-term governance) priorities
and approaches with regards to potential or real
sub-national administrative authorities clamouring
for assistance. While this discussion was both
pushed by the Resident Coordinator’s office as well
as – in a different form – by a key bilateral donor,
the UK, after 18 months of debate there is still no
basic consensus on either the principles or the
venue to discuss various rationales for engagement
of the different programmes concerned. The plan
for a future multi-donor ‘stability fund’ to be set
mainly through UK DFID (80–90 per cent of total
projected contributions), lists a number of
principles for engagement but also indicates that
these will be applied in highly flexible ways and
not necessarily all at the same time. What remains
is arguably a lack of joint engagement with the
notion of ‘do no harm’. Stabilisation programmes
have had mixed records in other contexts
(Fishstein and Wilder 2012) and there is no
shared understanding of the trade-offs that may
have to be made in the Somali context between
short-term objectives of using them to open a door
for dialogue with ‘actors on the ground’; for
dialogue between these actors; to reduce the
likelihood of immediate conflict by impact on
‘triggers’; or to create either short-term or long-
term economic prospects that would address some
of the structural root causes of conflict. 
5.2.5 A Nairobi effect? 
Most of the issues and challenges of coordination,
including the structural properties and
relationships that underpin it, do not, at first sight,
seem heavily conditioned by ‘remote control’
management or the Nairobi site. And yet it is
seen by most, if not all, interlocutors as a key
stumbling block for better aid coordination.
What impact would a move in-country have on
donor coordination? 
Interlocutors noted a number of issues related to
the Nairobi site: at a broader level, the
attractiveness of Nairobi is seen to reduce staff
rotation and thus maintain ‘business as usual’.
Also, ‘People don’t leave Nairobi; they just
reinvent themselves in new jobs. It would be
good to have some comparative thinking,
different experiences.’ Conversely, long
experience with Somalia is also seen as a benefit,
and thus judgement here may be more
individualised than structurally justified.
However, undoubtedly, relocation would imply
large organisational change for many actors,
changing staff composition and lines of authority
and, crucially, shortening the chain from impact
assessment to programme planning. This in turn
would alter relationships between the UN system
and donors and the government.
The disconnect between information about
implementation and impact of programmes is a
related issue, not just for implementing
agencies. Arguably for many SDG members
frustration with coordination activities was high
because it was diffusely felt to be a displacement
activity, disguising the lack of actual engagement
with monitoring and planning on the ground.
Some interlocutors thought that presence in-
country would change the priorities of aid
programmes: ‘If you’re in the country Somalis
are in your face more. I am sure there would be
more investment in infrastructure… Political
engagement would change.’ A larger focus on the
impact of aid would also, it was argued,
depersonalise some of the conflicts or tensions
that exist in the larger aid community, basing it
more on ‘reality’ – ‘bad communication is
exacerbated by the lack of knowledge and the
remote control setting’. It seems a fair bet that
the Somali population as a whole would
ultimately benefit. 
There are, however, limits to the blame that can
be put on geographical distance with regards to
all that is, to many, frustrating about Somalia aid
delivery. Not least is the fact that many issues,
including improved joint monitoring and
evaluations are geography-sensitive but not
geography-determined. Moreover, important
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problems of access would remain even after
relocation. Other issues of donor coordination,
such as the parallel role of non-traditional
donors would remain largely unaffected by
relocation to Somalia. In the words of one major
donor: ‘It’s remote control but everybody is here.
The non-traditional donors would not be in
Mogadishu either. They are in their capitals. The
only donor who is there is Turkey.’
Whereas a push for relocation would enable
closer linkages to Somali counterparts of all
types, some respondents also noted that the
notion of the ‘Nairobi mafia’ was much more an
issue for interlocutors from South Central
Somalia than Somaliland or Puntland:
‘Somaliland and Puntland complain less because
they have the capacity to be more involved’.
Inversely some donors acknowledged that the
relationship would not automatically improve
through common geography since distrust and
lack of transparency among various actors would
arguably travel along. One smaller donor noted
that they were ‘not sure one would not be
instrumentalised in-country; it might be even
more hectic’. And a major donor compared the
situation to a previous posting: ‘Wherever we
are, we all operate in a bubble with a lot of
manipulation’.
6 Conclusions 
The Somalia case showcases many of the well-
known issues with engagement in conflict states –
the boundaries between development, security,
‘politics’ and pure ‘humanitarian’ interventions
are difficult to define, if they exist, and certainly
are not stable over time. Actors affect each other
most of the time and operate under conditions of
high interdependence, without one being
dominant. The ‘intermediate’ level of Nairobi,
including the values and norms that are
emphasised, also clearly plays a key brokerage
role to the respective capitals. Following Ansell’s
theoretical work (2011), the prevalence of the
‘betwixt and between’ scenarios both for actors
and policy challenges presents large opportunities
for creative engagement, innovation and bricolage,
and change. But the platforms for such action to
develop and be recognised are few. 
Almost all actors and certainly most observers
will confirm the necessity of coordination in the
common interest of individual actors, and yet
formal coordination remains generally weak,
non-binding and elusive. ‘Development’ actors
see coordination as weak and it is certainly a
recurring problem between the ‘development’
and ‘political’ spheres. On the other hand,
humanitarian actors and donors have retreated
behind humanitarian principles, a separation
that arguably comes at the cost of overall
‘systemic’ learning, especially where
humanitarian and development activities (and
actors!) overlap over decades, notably in South
Central Somalia. 
With regards to government authorities, there is
a great paradox. At the macro level much
criticism has been heaped on Western countries’
insistence on maintaining the legal fiction of a
Somali state government when the current
Federal Government is in almost no way a
functioning administration and to many a
government in name only, propped up in part by
other states’ needs for a ‘functionally equivalent’
interlocutor, virtual or not. Yet when it comes to
aid management the approach, facilitated by the
Nairobi location, has been to wait for the fully
functioning interlocutor. The middle ground, the
attempt to build capacity for public policy (at
whatever level) during engagement, is only found
in project-specific dynamics, and only rarely. It
would arguably be a crucial part of any coherent
strategy of engagement.
At the multi-sectoral level, divisions persist as to
who leads coordination and through what means.
Meanwhile, coordination efforts that are effective
in jointly reducing policy ambiguity and defining
necessary trade-offs in competing priorities tend
to be driven by ad hoc and personalised
mechanisms. It is part of a familiar catch-22:
where actors are already aligned, information-
sharing can be sufficient coordination to improve
learning and increase collective impact. Where
this is not the case, more robust coordination is
needed. But where differences exist, robust
coordination may not be pushed far enough. 
One key victim, particularly in more turbulent
contexts is accountability and learning.
Coordination is a source of peer accountability, the
result of evaluations of organisations by their
counterparts, in short a pressure to behave better
(Grant and Keohane 2005). Yet the more informal,
or the less coordinated, the more difficult for
national counterparts as well as outsiders and
insiders to understand the mechanism of aid.
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Looking at existing interaction mechanisms in
the Somali donor community in terms of actual
relationships and networks provides some insight
into how strategies are pursued and what types
of peer-accountabilities exist. 
What appears here is a set of relationships that
are fundamentally about the exercise of
influence. Connections exist bounded by a very
broad subject area – engagement in Somalia –
and are shaped by geographical reality as well as
the broader Somali context. While conflict
among actors is not excessive, in the absence of
joint analysis and definitions of key priorities,
competitive logics are maintained and there is
ultimately only a very broad shared ideology at a
high level of aggregation (‘development’,
improving Somalia, fragile state principles).
Shared professional standards exist in sectoral
sub-systems but do little to inform broader
strategic planning (with the possible exception of
the humanitarian field). 
For actors, both fragile state characteristics and
their relationships affect power resources. The
size of a donor’s budget does not translate
directly into influence. Pure financial weight can
matter, but so does the ability to disburse flexibly
and quickly. By extension the appetite for risk
also determines clout at a specific time. Of
course, badly assessed risks undermine the latter
over time. In addition, fora for substantive
coordination are based on entrepreneurial
dynamics, not on formal structures, thus
benefiting those with the capacity and will to
engage in coalition-building. Often, creative and
successful coordination can occur based not on
multi-sectoral agreements but programme-
specific engagement that over time can be
replicated in other areas. Donors who are
engaged in many areas are more likely to be the
conduits for this. Differences in approaches will
persist due to the heterogeneity of all actors and
the multiplicity of interests involved. In such a
situation arguably too much coordination (or
centralisation) would be as undesirable as too
little. Yet the former is arguably so unlikely as
not to be a real risk whereas the latter is a widely
perceived – if not widely addressed – problem. 
Despite much distrust, UN agencies provide a
gatekeeper function vis-à-vis Somalia
counterparts. The internal division and perceived
biases of key UN institutions, combined with
their multiple roles make their task a difficult
one. They do constrain donor behaviour,
influence their room for manoeuvre, and provide
a broker role between donors and Somali
interlocutors. Yet this has also negative effects,
and is not always seen as conducive to common
approaches by all sides, which has meant that
multilateral principles are difficult to ‘settle’. 
Trilateral dialogue about aid, including Somali
counterparts, donors and the UN system remains
largely symbolic and at the diplomatic level. This
lack of joint engagement based on publicly
traceable ‘technical’ principles undermines both
accountability and joint learning over time, in turn
impacting trust, a potential resource for reform. 
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Notes
1 This includes the eight most permanent
members of the SDG, representing six of the
ten biggest ODA donors to Somalia between
2009–11 listed by OECD-DAC (of the
remaining four, Germany and Spain lack
development representation for Somalia in
Kenya, and Denmark was not available. The
last is the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS). Added
to this were the UN Political Office for
Somalia, the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator/Resident Coordinator for
Somalia, and the UNDP Somalia Office. 
2 This distinction is somewhat simplified as
both the ends and means of humanitarian and
of development aid are diverse and can overlap. 
3 These include the BTI (Bertelsman
Transformation Index) of the Bertelsman
Stiftung, the Fragile State Index at the
University of Maryland, the Index of State
Weakness at the Brookings Institution, and
the State Fragility Index (OECD 2011).
4 Until August 2012, the ‘Transitional Federal
Institutions’ were Somalia’s nominal
government. They had no capacity to fulfil
basic government functions and were riddled
by internal division. At the time of writing,
the end of the transition in August 2012 did
not change either circumstance. 
5 In 2012 AMISOM forced the al-Shabaab out
of Mogadishu and other population centres in
Southern Somalia.
6 UK DFID is almost doubling its budget,
Switzerland is engaging with a serious portfolio
from 2013 onwards, while the EU has boosted
its aid envelope with an extra €175 million to
come on stream in early 2013. Germany and
Turkey are among new and significant donors.
7 Interview with USAID Somalia, Nairobi. 
8 Norris and Bruton (2011: 23) show that the
USA has provided over US$185 million to
AMISOM between 2007–10 and the EU some
$297 between 2007–11. The USA has also
spent considerable sums paying the soldiers of
the TFG. 
9 According to Puntland authorities the average
days spent in Garoowe per year by UN Country
and Deputy Country Directors was three to
four days each, with only five individual or
joint donor visits in 2010 (OECD 2011: 23). 





11 Argument persists on greater ‘structural
integration’ (NRC n.d.). Some argue that
after 20 years of engagement, humanitarian
actors are deeply implicated in Somalia and
should engage in broader debates about
capacity-building, access and the role of aid in
the Somali war economy (Hammond and
Vaughan-Lee 2012). 
12 Humanitarian coordination mechanisms are
not discussed here. 
13 All agreed that formal coordination bodies
should be able to hold regular meetings; most
thought it should have ad hoc staff.
Respondents were in slight favour of joint
decisions but most wanted these to be based
on unanimity. All UN actors interviewed and
less than half of bilateral donors thought
coordination bodies should have permanent
staff. 
14 The CISS was supposed to be the
organisational anchor for the RDP but failed
in this regard. 
15 The Roadmap process was initially linked to
donor efforts to define clearer benchmarks for
support. Yet given the nature of the progress
reports and the dormant committee structure,
it failed to provide such a platform.
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